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Due Process-CLAims OF ABUSED CHILDREN AGAINST STATE
PROTECTVE AGENCIES-THE STATE'S RESPONSIBILITY AFTER DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189
(1989).
KRISTEN L. DAVENPORT
I. INTRODUCTIONO N July 27, 1989, Bradley McGee's stepfather and mother plunged
the youngster headfirst into a toilet and hit him with pillows
until he collapsed.' Bradley was being punished for soiling his dia-
pers. 2 He died the next evening from extensive head injuries., The
death of this blond-haired, blue-eyed two-year-old from Lakeland,
Florida, aroused the passions of Floridians statewide,4 not just be-
cause of the brutality of his beatings, but also because of the failure
of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) to
protect him.
Twenty-five to fifty percent of the fatal child abuse cases in the
United States each year occur in families that have previously been
reported to child protection agencies. 6 In states around the country,
child protection departments are being intensely scrutinized as chil-
dren who are supposed to be in their care are allowed to die.7 In the
face of Bradley McGee, Florida has been confronted once again by
the specter of child abuse and by the troubling issue of the extent of
the state's responsibility to protect children from the beatings of
adults.
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.8 This
Note will discuss the policy implications of DeShaney and suggest a
1. Tampa Tribune, July 30, 1989, at IA, col. 3.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Miami Herald, Sept. 14, 1989, at IB, col. 2; Miami Herald, Aug. 20, 1989, at 5B,
col. 4.
5. After more than a year of foster care, Bradley died only two months after being re-
turned to his mother. Miami Herald, Sept. 1, 1989, at IA, col. 5.
6. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1987, at BI, col. 3.
7. Tampa Tribune, Oct. 23, 1989, at I B, col. 4. See also Miami Herald, May 21, 1989, at
I B, col. 2.
8. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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way to ensure that states cannot abdicate responsibility for abused
children despite this ruling.
II. THE CASE
"I just knew that the phone would ring some day and Joshua would
be dead," said a Wisconsin Department of Social Services case worker
upon hearing that four-year-old Joshua DeShaney had been beaten so
severely by his father that he fell into a coma.9 The resultant brain
damage is expected to relegate Joshua to confinement in an institution
for the profoundly retarded for the rest of his life.' 0
This final, crippling beating took place more than two years after
the state authorities were first informed of Joshua's dangerous situa-
tion." During this time, emergency room personnel who treated
Joshua made three separate reports of abuse, and a case worker from
the state observed numerous suspicious injuries. 2 Despite these re-
ports and the failure of Joshua's father to comply with his agreement
with the Department to take various steps to ensure the boy's wel-
fare, 3 the social worker took no action to help the child but merely
"dutifully recorded these incidents in her files."' 4
Joshua and his mother subsequently filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983,11 alleging that the Department had deprived Joshua of his right
to due process of law by failing to protect him when they knew, or
should have known, that he was in danger. 6 The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants, which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 7 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari 8 and also affirmed. 9
9. Id. at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 193.
11. Id.
12. The social worker assigned to the case visited the DeShaney home nearly twenty times.
Id. at 209.
13. Mr. DeShaney promised to attend counseling sessions, to convince his girlfriend to
move out of the DeShaney home, and to enroll Joshua in preschool. Id. at 192-93.
14. Id.
15. This statute provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or :other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, .or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
16. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
17. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987).
18. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 485 U.S. 958 (1988).
19. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 194.
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III. THE SECTION 1983 CLAIM
In Martinez v. California,20 the Supreme Court considered the ques-
tion of the liability of state officials under the due process clause for
the murder of a private citizen by a parolee. Rather than directly ad-
dress the issue, the Court decided the case on the narrow ground that
the causal connection between the action of the state in releasing the
murderer and the death of the citizen was too attenuated to establish a
deprivation of rights under section 1983.21 In dicta, however, the
Court stated "[w]e need not and do not decide that a parole officer
could never be deemed to 'deprive' someone of life by action taken in
connection with the release of a prisoner on parole." '22
Several courts of appeals interpreted this language to mean that if
the state is aware of a danger to a victim and indicates a willingness to
protect that victim, a "special relationship ' 23 arises, requiring the
state to provide adequate protection. For example, in Estate of Bailey
v. County of York, 24 the Court held that a special relationship be-
tween the state and a child arose when the state took the child into
custody and later returned her to her mother, aware that the child had
been abused. 25 Therefore, the state had a duty to protect her. 26
The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of Martinez in De-
Shaney, stating that a special relationship giving rise to a duty to pro-
tect occurs only when the state has an individual in its custody when
the harm takes place. 27 Joshua's presence in state custody and subse-
quent return to his father did not influence the Court. 28 The Court
20. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
21. Id. at 284-85.
22. Id. at 285 (footnote omitted).
23. The court must find a "special relationship" in this situation in order to sustain a sec-
tion 1983 action, for there is, in general, no constitutional duty imposed on state officials to
protect members of the public at large from crime, Wright v. City of Ozark, 715 F.2d 1513, 1515
(1 th Cir. 1983) ("the due process clause ... does not protect a member of the public at large
. • • , at least in the absence of a special relationship between the victim and the criminal or
between the victim and the state."); see also Martinez, 444 U.S. at 284-85.
24. 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985).
25. Id. at 510-11. See also Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir.
1988) (listing factors to be considered in determining the existence of a special relationship);
Jenson v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 190-94 (4th Cir. 1984) (tracing the evolution of the special
relationship concept).
26. 768 F.2d at 510-Il.
27. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199 (1989). See,
e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (involuntarily committed mental patients consti-
tutionally entitled to services); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (incarcerated prisoners
must be protected).
28. Compare Bowers v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982):
If the state puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to
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stated that "it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the indivi-
dual's freedom to act on his own behalf ... which is the 'deprivation
of liberty' triggering the protections of the due process clause, not its
failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by
other means.' '29
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 6-3 majority, stated that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, on which section
1983 actions are based, is a limitation on a state's power to act, not an
imposition of an affirmative obligation on the part of a state to pro-
vide services. 30 The Court reasoned that because the due process clause
does not require the state to provide protective services, the state bears
no liability for injuries that could have been prevented had it chosen
to furnish them l.3 Therefore, the state was not liable for its failure to
provide protective services to Joshua. 32 In so holding, the Court drew
a rigid line between an action of a state which deprives an individual
of rights and a failure of a state to act which has the same result."
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DESHANEY
The Court's refusal to hold the state responsible when its child care
workers are negligent 34 strikes a blow to the recent legal developments
intended to stop the ever-increasing problem of child abuse in this
country. Laws against child abuse affirmatively recognize that paren-
tal rights are not absolute and that the state should intervene into pri-
protect him, it will not be heard to say that its role was merely passive; it is as much
an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit.
Id. at 618.
29. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (footnote omitted). One wonders how Joshua, a four-year-
old, could have "acted on his own behalf" once he was turned over to his father by the state.
See also id. at 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (reading Youngberg and Estelle to stand for the
proposition that "if a State cuts off private sources of aid and then refuses aid itself, it cannot
wash its hands of the harm that results from its inaction."); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d
1211, 1223 (7th Cir. 1988) (imposing a duty on a state to protect when it cuts off private aid-a
"monopoly exception" to general rule of no duty). But see generally Note, Snake Pits, Lion's
Dens and Section 1983: When Does Inaction Equal Action-DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, 24 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 781, 794-821 (1989) (discussing special
relationship doctrine and praising the result in DeShaney).
30. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
31. Id. at 196-97.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 204-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (questioning the drawing of this line and the
failure of the majority to focus on the actions taken by the state to aid Joshua). See generally
Note, Negligent Failure to Rescue; Liability under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983: DeShaney v. Winne-
bago County Dep't of Social Serv., 12 HAMirNE L. REv. 421 (1989) (criticizing the Court's nar-
row reading of section 1983).
34. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
CLAIMS OF ABUSED CHILDREN
vate family matters to protect endangered children. This doctrine of
parens patriae long ago replaced the view of ancient civilizations that
parents should have the ultimate responsibility concerning all deci-
sions relating to their children, including the decision to kill them .3
The ever-increasing intervention of the state has displaced the role
of private actors in providing such basic necessities as the teaching
and nurturing of children,36 a development which is probably inevita-
ble in an industrial society." With this added responsibility must come
accountability, yet the Court in DeShaney has sent the message that
states will not be held accountable for their actions. Under the doc-
trine of parens patriae, the state clearly has the authority to pursue the
overwhelming societal interest in protecting children from abuse.38
Having exercised this authority by installing a child welfare system,
the state must at least assume the responsibility for seeing that it is
competently administered. The child welfare system is meaningless if
the state bears no liability for failing to fulfill this responsibility.
In In re Gault,39 the Supreme Court stated that the Constitution
does not apply only to adults, but protects children as well. 40 Accord-
ing to the majority in DeShaney, however, the Constitution turns its
back on children when they are being brutally beaten by their own
parents, even though the state, by acting with due care, could have
prevented that harm. No duty is owed, said the Court, because abused
children are no worse off than they would have been had the state
taken no action on their behalf.4'
The Court's assertion would be more palatable if the state had not
displaced all former sources of help for the child. By establishing a
system to receive and act on abuse complaints, the state created a reli-
ance interest in the public. With this system in place, neighbors, rela-
35. See Herman, A Statutory Proposal to Prohibit the Infliction of Violence upon Chil-
dren, 19 FAM. L.Q. 1, 5 (1985). See generally Radbill, A History of Child Abuse and Infanticide,
in VIOLENCE IN THE FA ry 173 (S. Steinmetz & M. Straus eds. 1974); Thomas, Child Abuse and
Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspective, 50 N.C.L. REv. 293
(1972) (giving a comprehensive history of child abuse).
36. See L. HOULGATE, FAILY AND STATE 31 (1988); Caplow, The Loco Parent: Federal
Policy and Family Life, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 709-14.
37. See W. GOODSELL, A HISTORY OF THE FAMILY AS A SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITU-
TION 461-64 (1915); Cf. S. KNOX, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW 111-39 (1941) (the Great Depression
created a societal need for security which provided the necessary impetus for modern welfare
legislation to protect both children and adults).
38. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-67 (1944).
39. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
40. Id. at 13.
41. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989). But
see Doe v. Milwaukee County, 712 F. Supp. 1370, 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (stating that "[t]he
majority's reasoning on this point may have been less than compelling").
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tives, teachers, and health care professionals feel they have "done
their duty" by reporting suspected abuse to the appropriate authori-
ties, not realizing that those officials can stand by and do nothing
with absolutely no accountability. It seems self-evident that if this sys-
tem did not exist, concerned adults would more readily take the initia-
tive to speak to the abuser, call the police, or even personally rescue
the child. 42 As in any situation where the state interferes in what was
formerly a private domain, this interference ultimately replaces the
position of private actors.4 3
Given the recent legislative enactments designed to protect chil-
dren,"4 it is ironic that the Supreme Court, the traditional guardian of
the helpless, would be the one to turn its back on the victims of child
abuse. As Justice Blackmun recognized, the Court justifiably could
have "gone either way" in DeShaney by reading its previous section
1983 decisions narrowly or broadly.s Indeed, one would be hard
pressed to assert that Justice Brennan's approach to section 198346 is
unsound.
The Court has previously insisted upon adequate protection of chil-
dren, recognizing that children's safety and well-being take precedence
over such Constitutional cornerstones as free speech47 and the free ex-
ercise of religion.4 In DeShaney, the Court took a step backward into
the ancient time of parental control over the life, and death, of their
child by allowing the state to abdicate its role of parens patriae when
that role could result in legal liability.
Perhaps the Court feared opening a floodgate of litigation involving
the removal of children from their homes. 49 Indeed, the literature on
42. While the merit of self help is undoubtedly questionable in these situations, surely it is
no more questionable than the merit of a child protection service that is not held accountable for
protecting children drawn to its attention.
43. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 210 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Through its child-welfare
program, . . . the State of Wisconsin has relieved ordinary citizens and governmental bodies
other than the Department of any sense of obligation to do anything more than report their
suspicions of child abuse to DSS.").
44. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
45. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 203-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
48. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
49. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203. See also Vosburg v. Department of Social Servs., 884
F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1989) (granting absolute immunity to child protection workers); Besharov,
"Doing Something" About Child Abuse: The Need to Narrow the Grounds for State Interven-
tion, 8 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 539 (1985) (asserting that child protection workers are so afraid
of letting children die that they intervene far too frequently, and advocating absolute immunity
for their decisions).
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this issue is often conflicting and uncertain. 0 While the specter of a
jury second-guessing every case worker's decision with the benefit of
hindsight is indeed frightening, this fear does not justify denying
Joshua DeShaney, and the potential thousands like him, his day in
court.
Joshua DeShaney may have been unsuccessful before a jury. The
state would have had little difficulty establishing the substantial de-
gree of uncertainty surrounding the unenviable decision to remove
Joshua from his biological family. Perhaps the jury would have re-
warded Joshua not because of the responsibility of the state, but out
of pity. Again, however, this is no reason to take away Joshua's day
in court. Pity is an element in many cases-an element the law deals
with not by taking away the right to sue, but through careful instruc-
tions to the jury, through rules of evidence disallowing overly prejudi-
cial items, 5 and through careful supervision by trial judges and
appellate courts.
In addition, the high standard of fault required in a section 1983
action mitigates against the possibility of a "pity award." While the
DeShaney Court did not reach the issue of the requisite degree of fault
in actions such as this,52 proof of mere negligence almost certainly
would not have sufficed. Mere negligence will not support a substan-
tive due process claim," although the Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed whether something less than intentional conduct, such as gross
negligence or recklessness, is actionable. 4
While mandatory reporting laws," immunity from liability for re-
porting abuse, 6 modifications of the rules of evidence,5 7 and passive
50. See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREuD & A. SOLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1979); Besharov, supra note 49; Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 423 (1983); Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interest?, 43 HARv. EDUC. REV. 599
(1973); Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of
Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination
of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1976).
51. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (1989).
52. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202 n.10.
53. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-34 (1986).
54. Id. at 333-35. See generally Note, Government Liability for Failure to Prevent Child
Abuse: A Rationale for Absolute Immunity, 27 B.C.L. REV. 949, 958-60 (1986). The lower
courts are divided on the exact standard of liability. Compare Washington v. District of Colum-
bia, 802 F.2d 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (not even recklessness is sufficient) with Colburn v. Upper
Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1988) (adopting a gross negligence standard).
55. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 415.504 (Supp. 1990). See also Note, Unequal and Inadequate
Protection Under the Law: State Child Abuse Statutes, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243, 272-74
(1982).
56. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 415.511 (Supp. 1990). See also Note, Reporting Child Abuse:
1991]
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partner liability58 are undoubtedly helpful in combating the problem
of child abuse, these steps are all for naught if, in the end, the state
can step back from the failure of its own system and wash its hands of
the responsibility. Unless these laws and policies are enforced by a
competent system, they will almost certainly be ineffective.
By failing to hold states responsible for their own ineptitude, the
Supreme Court has sent the message that it will not use its power to
force the state to perform competently the tasks it undertakes to pro-
tect children, thereby weakening the protections enumerated above.
For example, special trial rules will be meaningless because abusers
will never be brought to trial without competent investigators-until,
of course, it is too late, as in the cases of Joshua DeShaney and Brad-
ley McGee. Mandatory reporting will be similarly meaningless if the
reports are merely "dutifully recorded ' 59 but never acted upon.
While none of the above legislative steps have eliminated the prob-
lem of child abuse, lessening the effectiveness of these measures surely
is not going to help the situation. Incompetent child protection work-
ers seem to be a big part of the problem, and relieving them of the
responsibility for their actions-or inactions-certainly is not the an-
swer. 6o
V. A WAY AROUND DESHANEY
The petitioners in DeShaney also argued that the Wisconsin child
protection statute gave abused children an "entitlement" to receive
protective services in accordance with the terms of the statute. 6' Under
Board of Regents v. Roth, 62 this entitlement would enjoy due process
When Moral Obligations Fail, 15 PAC. L.J. 189 (1983) (advocating tort liability for failure to
report abuse).
57. See, e.g., Skoler, New Hearsay Exceptions for a Child's Statement of Sexual Abuse, 18
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (1984); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecu-
tions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARv. L. Rav. 806 (1985).
58. See Note, The Broadening Scope of Liability in Child Abuse Cases, 27 J. FAM. L. 697
(1988-89).
59. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 192-93
(1989).
60. The Supreme Court recognized that liability could be found in abuse cases under state
tort law. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201-03. While the relative merits of tort liability are beyond the
scope of this discussion, this Note contends that section 1983 claims are not yet completely
barred, see infra notes 61-82 and accompanying text, and that these claims should be allowed to
ensure a remedy exists in those states refusing to impose tort liability in this context. See, e.g.,
Nelson v. Freeman, 537 F. Supp. 602 (W.D. Mo. 1982), aff'd sub. nom., Nelson v. Missouri
Div. of Family Servs., 706 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding no individual duty to abused child
under Missouri Child Abuse Statute); but see, e.g., Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d
662 (D.C. 1987); Mammo v. State, 138 Ariz. 528, 675 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
61. 489 U.S. at 195 n.2.
62. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
CLAIMS OF ABUSED CHILDREN
protection against state deprivation.63 Therefore, the child would have
a section 1983 claim if the protections enumerated in the state's child
protection statute were not competently rendered. The Court declined
to rule on this issue because it was raised for the first time in the peti-
tioners' brief to the Court."
In Goldberg v. Kelly, 65 the Supreme Court held that welfare reci-
pients are entitled to hearings before a state may terminate their bene-
fits."6 The Court stated that although the Constitution does not
impose a requirement that the state provide welfare benefits, once the
state undertakes to provide them, the due process clause imposes an
obligation to do so fairly. 67 Property, for the purposes of due process
protection, does not consist merely of the traditional concepts of land
and personal possessions," but is defined in light of the expectation
created by state law.6 Therefore, protective services could be regarded
as a property right if the state's child protection statute is drafted in a
way that creates an entitlement to those services.
By refusing to address the entitlement issue, the Court has left open
a loophole that could serve to impose liability on states when child
protective services are performed incompetently. This loophole could
serve to eradicate the undesirable policy of allowing a state to escape
responsibility for children's deaths as long as its negligence is a result
of inaction rather than action.70 At the same time, the existence of this
loophole would allow states to limit their liability by carefully drafting
their child protection statutes to avoid creating an entitlement to child
protective services. Such a statute would also put the public on notice
that no legal recourse would be available for the harm caused by in-
competent provision of services, thereby reducing the public's reliance
on state child protection agencies. 7' In addition, because an entitle-
ment claim would be based on state statute, liability could be imposed
63. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195 n.2.
64. Id. See Old Jordan Mining & Milling Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 164 U.S. 261,
264-65 (18%).
65. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
66. Id. at 261.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975) (public education is a property inter-
est under due process clause).
69. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 n.7 (1976). An abstract need or desire does not
create an entitlement. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
70. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
71. The importance of reducing the public's reliance on state agencies in those situations
where the state will not be held responsible for its incompetence cannot be overestimated. See
supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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without construing the due process clause to place positive obligations
on states, a construction the Court obviously wants to avoid.7 2
The future of this "loophole" is unclear. The District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin specifically addressed the entitlement is-
sue in Doe v. Milwaukee County.73 The court reluctantly held that the
Wisconsin child abuse statute74 did not create a legitimate claim of
entitlement to an investigation by the Department. 75 However, the de-
cision was made on the narrow ground that the specific statutory
scheme did not create an entitlement in the particular circumstances of
the case before the court. 76 This very narrow holding is a positive sign
that the entitlement argument will be well-received by courts.
Florida is likely to be one of the states that accepts the entitlement
argument. The Florida courts have been receptive to arguments that
the state owes a duty to protect individuals in certain situations. For
example, in Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Ya-
muni,77 the Florida Supreme Court held that HRS had a "statutory
duty of care to prevent further harm to children when reports of child
abuse are received. "78
Furthermore, the Florida child abuse statute79 specifically compels
the department to perform an on-site child protection evaluation for
each report it receives80 and gives specific guidelines regarding the fac-
tors to be considered and the intervention which must take place.8'
These specific requirements should be sufficient to create an entitle-
72. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-97
(1989). This Note does not contend that the due process clause requires a state to adopt measures
to protect abused children, but rather it supports the position that when the state does adopt
such measures, it must be held accountable for its failure. For the view that the Constitution
does impose a duty to protect, see Miller, Toward a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 Sup.
CT. REV. 199.
73. 712 F. Supp. 1370, 1376-78 (E.D. Wis. 1989).
74. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989).
75. 712 F. Supp. at 1377.
76. Id. The Wisconsin statute requires the social service department to conduct an investi-
gation when a report is received under subsection 3(a)-that is, when the report comes from one
of the persons required to report under section 48.981(2). Nothing in the statute compels an
investigation when the report is made by someone not required to do so under section 48.981(2).
Id. The abuse report in the Doe case was made by the children's relatives, none of whom were
obligated to report under the statute. Id. Therefore, the children "[a]lmost, but not quite" had
an entitlement under the statute. Id.
77. 529 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 1988).
78. Id. at 261. This holding subjected HRS to tort liability. See supra note 60. See also
Florida First Nat'l Bank v. City of Jacksonville, 310 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Ist DCA 1975) (police
regulations gave rise to special duty once victims were clearly and specifically identified).
79. FA. STAT. § 415.505 (Supp. 1990).
80. Unlike the Wisconsin statute at issue in Doe, discussed supra note 76, there appear to be
no technical requirements as to which reports must be investigated under the Florida statute.
81. See FLA. STAT. § 415.505 (Supp. 1990).
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ment for abused children who have been reported to HRS.8 2 Holding
the state accountable when its employees fail to follow their own pro-
cedures would be an important step toward a "system" which effec-
tively protects children.
VI. CONCLUSION
Four HRS employees knew that Bradley McGee was being physi-
cally abused and subjected to bizarre punishments, including being
forced to eat his own feces.83 These officials failed to even report their
knowledge to the abuse registry,84 and one worker recommended to
the juvenile judge that the child be returned permanently to his par-
ents, failing to inform the judge about a report critical of their parent-
ing skills.8 5 As the law now stands, no federal avenues are available to
hold these officials accountable to children like Bradley McGee.
The Court in DeShaney allowed the state to escape liability for its
own mistakes, which will ultimately lessen the effectiveness of current
legislative attempts to combat child abuse. While money damages un-
der a section 1983 action would not restore Bradley McGee's life nor
Joshua DeShaney's vitality, it would be, at least, a step in the right
direction. The message would then be clear that the state cannot wash
its hands of its responsibilities.
The entitlement claim left open by the Court would be an effective
way to hold states accountable for their mistakes, while still ensuring
that legislatures have some control over state liability. The Florida
courts should be receptive to this type of claim.
82. See generally Comment, Actionable Inaction: Section 1983 Liability for Failure to Act,
53 U. Cm. L. REV. 1048 (1986) (advocating an entitlement approach to state inaction claims
under section 1983).
83. Supra note 5, at 18A, col. I.
84. Id.
85. Orlando Sentinel, June 16, 1990, at Al, col. 1. This worker was convicted of a felony
child abuse charge and 'a misdemeanor count of failing to report suspected abuse. Id.
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